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 1  See  AM  Kjaer ,  Governance ( Cambridge ,  Polity Press ,  2004 )  10 (defi ning governance as 
 ‘ the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules ’ ). 
 2  See  K  Raustiala ,  ‘ Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation ’ 
( 2000 )  32  Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law  387, 388 ( ‘ Compliance  … is 
typically an important aspect of the production of institutional effectiveness, but not the only 
aspect ’ ). 
 3  See  JG  March and  JP  Olsen ,  ‘ The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders ’ 
( 1998 )  52  International Organization  943 (distinguishing the logic of appropriateness and the 
logic of consequences in decision-making);  TR  Tyler ,  Why People Obey the Law ( Princeton , 
 Princeton University Press ,  1990 ) (analysing the role of legitimacy in compliance). 
 4  Two clarifi cations are in order. First, enforcement is not necessarily a precondition for 
compliance. A well-designed governance system that attends to background factors will tend to 
elicit compliance without enforcement. Second, there can, of course, be a relationship between 
background factors and enforcement. eg, punishment at the enforcement stage may feed back 
into the background cost – benefi t analysis, thus enhancing future compliance by other persons 
without enforcement. 
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 Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: Governance, Rights, 
and the Market for Dispute 
Resolution Services 
 CHRISTOPHER  A WHYTOCK 
 ENFORCEMENT — ALONG WITH rulemaking and rule application — is a basic function of any system of governance. 1 The effectiveness of a governance system depends signifi cantly on compliance with 
the rules it produces. 2 Compliance, in turn, depends in the fi rst instance 
on ex ante background factors that infl uence a person ’ s understanding of 
the legitimacy of a governance system and its rules and the expected costs 
and benefi ts of non-compliance. 3 Enforcement is the process of obtaining a 
person ’ s compliance or punishing a person ’ s non-compliance when ex ante 
background factors fail to elicit compliance. 4 
 In a governance system with courts, one basic type of enforcement is the 
enforcement of court judgments. For example, if background factors do 
not lead a judgment debtor to comply with a money judgment in the fi rst 
instance, enforcement measures may then be taken to compel payment to the 
From Hans-W Micklitz & Andrea Wechsler, eds., The 
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 5  See  M  Shapiro ,  Courts :  A Comparative and Political Analysis ( Chicago ,  The University 
of Chicago Press ,  1981 ) ;  M  Shapiro and  AS  Sweet ,  On Law, Politics, And Judicialization 
( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2002 ) ;  CN  Tate and  T  Vallinder (eds),  The Global Expan-
sion of Judicial Power ( New York ,  NYU Press ,  1995 ) ;  RA  Dahl ,  ‘ Decision-Making in a Democ-
racy :  The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker ’ ( 1957 )  6  Journal of Public Law  279 ; 
 CA  Whytock ,  ‘ Domestic Courts and Global Governance ’ ( 2009 )  84  Tulane Law Review  67 . 
 6  The  ‘ who gets what ’ question has long preoccupied scholars of domestic systems of gov-
ernance. See, eg  HD  Lasswell ,  Politics :  Who Gets What, When, How ( New York ,  Whittseley 
House ,  1936 ) .  cf  RM  Cover ,  ‘ Dispute Resolution :  A Foreword ’ ( 1979 )  88  Yale Law Journal 
 910, 911 (noting that courts both solve disputes and distribute resources);  M  Shapiro ,  ‘ From 
Public Law to Public Policy, or the  “ Public ” in  “ Public Law ” ’ ( 1972 )  5  Political Science  & 
Politics  410, 413 (discussing  ‘ judicial allocation of values ’ ). 
 7  For an in-depth analysis of transnational judicial governance, see Whytock (n 5) and  CA 
 Whytock ,  ‘ Transnational Judicial Governance ’ ( 2012 )  2  St John ’ s Journal of International  & 
Comparative Law  55 .  cf  TL  Putnam ,  ‘ Courts Without Borders :  Domestic Sources of US Extra-
territoriality in the Regulatory Sphere ’ ( 2009 )  63  International Organization  459 (exploring 
how domestic courts have come to regulate persons and conduct outside their states ’ borders 
by claiming jurisdiction over transactions with local and extraterritorial elements). 
 8  See generally  HL  Buxbaum ,  ‘ Transnational Regulatory Litigation ’ ( 2006 )  46  Virginia 
Journal of International Law  251, 253 – 54 (examining the rise in cases brought in US courts 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, applying international law norms to secure remedies for viola-
tion of those norms that would not otherwise be available). 
 9  HH  Koh ,  ‘ Transnational Public Law Litigation ’ ( 1991 )  100  Yale Law Journal  2347, 2348 
(discussing how traditional domestic litigation and traditional international law litigation have 
merged to form a blended body of  ‘ transnational ’ public law). 
judgment creditor. A standard enforcement measure is execution, whereby 
a court issues an order directing an enforcement agent (such as a sheriff 
or  huissier de justice ) to seize property of the judgment debtor, sell it, and 
deliver the proceeds to the judgment creditor in satisfaction of the judgment. 
The enforcement of court judgments is an important governance function 
because courts themselves perform important governance functions. 5 They 
offer dispute resolution services in the form of litigation, and in the process 
they authoritatively interpret rules and apply them to particular situations. 
From the perspective of political science, courts not only resolve discrete dis-
putes, but also contribute to the authoritative allocation of resources within 
a society, thus answering a basic question of governance: Who gets what ? 6 
 When national courts decide cases involving parties of different nation-
alities or activities that occur or have effects in the territory of more than 
one nation, they engage in what I call  transnational judicial governance . 7 In 
addition to determining the rights and obligations of transnational actors, 
they regulate extraterritorial activity and they allocate governance author-
ity among nations, between national and international institutions, and 
between private and public actors. For example, in transnational regulatory 
litigation, national courts apply national regulatory norms to determine 
rights and obligations of transnational actors. 8 In transnational public law 
litigation,  ‘ [p]rivate individuals, government offi cials, and nations sue one 
another directly, and are sued directly, in a variety of judicial fora, most 
prominently, domestic courts ’ , 9 based on rights derived from both national 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3790981
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 10  See generally  R  Wai ,  ‘ Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance ’ 
in  M  Lederer and  PS  M ü ller (eds),  Criticizing Global Governance ( New York ,  Palgrave 
 Macmillan ,  2005 )  243 (analysing transnational private litigation). 
and international law. And in transnational private litigation, national 
courts resolve transnational disputes under different nations ’ private law 
rules (for example rules governing torts, contracts and property) — rules that 
refl ect these nations ’ respective distributive and regulatory policies. 10 
 The same multinational connections that enable transnational judicial 
governance can also create special enforcement challenges. If a court in one 
nation (N1) issues a money judgment but the judgment debtor has no assets 
in N1, enforcement may be impossible there. The judgment creditor may 
then seek enforcement in another nation (N2) where the judgment debtor 
does have assets. From N2 ’ s perspective, the N1 judgment is a foreign judg-
ment. The problem is that sovereignty principles and related customary 
international law principles on jurisdiction generally prohibit nations from 
taking enforcement measures in the territory of other nations. Moreover, 
there is no general rule of international law requiring nations to enforce 
foreign judgments. Therefore, the ability to enforce the N1 judgment in N2 
depends on the willingness of an N2 court to order enforcement against the 
judgment debtor ’ s N2 assets, which in turn depends on N2 ’ s private inter-
national law (confl ict of laws) rules. 
 The stakes are high both for nations, because the enforcement of  foreign 
judgments is one factor that determines the quality of transnational judicial 
governance, and for individual litigants, because the enforcement of foreign 
judgments affects their legal rights. In this chapter, I analyse the rules of 
 foreign judgment enforcement from both perspectives. I do so compara-
tively, with a focus on the private international law rules of the European 
Union (EU) and United States (US) applicable to  foreign judgments in civil 
and commercial matters, in order to highlight how  different approaches 
strike different balances between two sets of enforcement  values: govern-
ance values and rights values. Part I provides an overview of governance 
values and rights values. Part II examines a spectrum of ideal-type and real-
world approaches to foreign judgment enforcement — ranging from always 
enforce, to the US and EU approaches to their respective internal judgments 
(full faith and credit and the Brussels I Regulation), to national treatment 
of external judgments, to never enforce — and explains how they score on 
different governance values and rights values. Part III is more  conjectural. 
It proposes lessons of this chapter ’ s analysis for the design of private inter-
national law rules governing foreign judgments, and speculates about the 
causes and consequences of the evolution of the law of foreign judgments in 
the transatlantic area — including implications for the transnational market 
for dispute resolution services. 
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 11  For a preliminary sketch of these two types of values and their application to EU and 
US private international law, see  CA  Whytock ,  ‘ Faith and Scepticism in Private International 
Law :  Trust, Governance, Politics, and Foreign Judgments ’ ( 2014 )  7  Erasmus Law Review  113 . 
 12  See  RO  Keohane ,  Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World ( London , 
 Routledge ,  2002 )  245 – 46 (defi ning governance as  ‘ the processes and institutions, both formal 
and informal, that guide and restrain  … collective activit[y] ’ ). 
 13  See Whytock (n 5) 31. 
 14  See  R  Michaels ,  ‘ Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments ’ in  Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law , available at  www.mpepil.com (noting that  ‘ the gen-
eral public has an interest in avoiding resources spent on re-litigation and in international 
decisional harmonies ’ );  AT  von Mehren and  DT  Trautman ,  ‘ Recognition of Foreign Adjudica-
tions :  A Survey and a Suggested Approach ’ ( 1968 )  81  Harvard Law Review  1601, 1603 – 04 
(noting  ‘ desire to avoid the duplication of effort and consequent waste involved in reconsid-
ering a matter that has already been litigated ’ ). See also  J  Lookofsky and  K  Hertz ,  EU-PIL : 
 European Union Private International Law in Contract and Tort ( New York ,  JurisNet ,  2009 ) 
 135 (noting importance of foreign judgment enforcement to  ‘ promote effi ciency and economy 
in international business ’ ). 
 15  AT  Von Mehren ,  ‘ Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments — General Theory 
and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements ’ ( 1981 )  167  Recueil des Cours  20 – 22 . 
 I. ENFORCEMENT VALUES 
 Although enforcement is a basic governance function, it would be a mis-
take to understand enforcement in purely functional terms, because 
 enforcement — like private international law generally — implicates impor-
tant societal values. In the context of foreign judgment enforcement, 
enforcement values can be placed roughly into two categories: governance 
values and rights values. 11 
 A. Governance Values 
 Governance values focus on policies facilitating, guiding or restraining 
 collective activity. 12 These values have implications that extend beyond 
the parties to particular disputes. 13 Governance values include  effi ciency , 
which is concerned with avoiding the expenditure of societal resources to 
re-litigate issues that have already been litigated, and with reducing trans-
action costs in transnational business. 14 If N2 declines to enforce an N1 
judgment, duplicative public resources of N2 ’ s legal system and private 
resources of the  litigants will be expended if the claimant subsequently pur-
sues the same claim in N2. These costs can be avoided — and effi ciency thus 
increased — if N2 renders duplicative litigation unnecessary by enforcing the 
N1 judgment. 
 Closely related to effi ciency is the principle of  repose , which emphasises 
 ‘ the need to put to rest quarrels and disputes that have arisen so that the 
energies of individuals and the resources of society can be devoted to more 
constructive tasks ’ . 15 One way of understanding repose is in terms of public 
and private opportunity costs. If N2 declines to enforce the N1 judgment 
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 16  AF  Lowenfeld ,  ‘ International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness :  General Court 
on Private International Law ’ ( 1994 )  245  Recueil des Cours  109 . See also Von Mehren and 
Trautman (n 14) 1603 – 04 (noting  ‘ interest in fostering stability and unity in an international 
order in which many aspects of life are not confi ned to any single jurisdiction  … ’ ); Michaels 
(n 14) 2 (referring to  ‘ transnational legal certainty ’ as a value underlying the enforcement of 
foreign judgments). 
 17  Von Mehren and Trautman (n 14) 1603 – 04. See also Michaels (n 14) 2 ( ‘ Dutch authors, 
in particular Voet and Huber, developed [the principle of] comity, defi ned much later by the 
United States Supreme Court in [ Hilton v Guyot ] a decision denying recognition to a French 
judgment as  “ neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand nor of mere courtesy and 
good will  … it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another  … ” ’ ). 
and the plaintiff fi les the same claim against the defendant in N2, then N2 
will spend public resources for its courts to adjudicate the claim that it could 
otherwise spend on other judicial matters, and the parties will spend private 
resources on litigation that they could otherwise spend on more benefi cial 
endeavours. N2 ’ s enforcement of the N1 judgment would bring the dispute 
to an end and avoid these public and private opportunity costs. 
 Another governance value is  certainty , which helps  ‘ establish the security 
of contracts, promote commercial dealings, and generally further the rule of 
law among states that are interdependent as well as independent ’ . 16 Among 
the uncertainties of transnational litigation is uncertainty about whether 
an N1 judgment will be enforced in other nations. This uncertainty can 
lead to fi nancial and contractual uncertainty, because it is unclear whether a 
judgment that otherwise would establish the parties ’ fi nancial and contrac-
tual responsibilities will ultimately be given effect. This uncertainty can be 
avoided, and the parties ’ planning for the future facilitated, if N2 enforces —
 and is expected to enforce — N1 judgments. 
 A somewhat different governance value is  comity . Comity is the respect 
that one nation gives to another nation as a legally equal sovereign. Comity 
may  ‘ foster  … stability and unity in an international order ’ by avoiding con-
fl ict among nations and by promoting reciprocity in the respect that nations 
give to each other. 17 N2 may owe no international legal obligation to N1 
to enforce an N1 judgment, but by nevertheless enforcing it N2 furthers the 
value of comity, thus avoiding the offence to (and perhaps confl ict with) N1 
that could be caused by N2 ’ s refusal to respect the judgment, and encourag-
ing N1 to reciprocate by enforcing N2 judgments. 
 B. Rights Values 
 Foreign judgment enforcement also implicates rights values. These values 
focus on justice for particular litigants in particular cases. One rights value 
is  correctness , including both substantive and procedural correctness. As 
Arthur von Mehren puts it, the  ‘ principle of correctness  … expresses the 
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 18  Von Mehren (n 15) 20 – 22. 
 19  CA  Whytock ,  ‘ Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access ’ ( 2013 )  93  Boston 
University Law Review  2033 ;  CA  Whytock and  CB  Robertson ,  ‘ Forum Non Conveniens and 
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments ’ ( 2011 )  111  Columbia Law Review  1444, 1472 . 
 20  Whytock and Robertson (n 19) 1472. 
 21  See  XE  Kramer ,  ‘ Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-Bis Reg :  Towards a New 
Balance Between Mutual Trust and National Control Over Fundamental Rights ’ ( 2013 ) 
 60  Netherlands International Law Review  343, 367 ( ‘ The abolition of exequatur has  … been 
justifi ed by the desire to enhance access to justice and the right to an effective remedy, as guar-
anteed by Art 47 of the EU Charter and Arts 6 and 13 of the ECHR.  … From the perspective of 
the judgment creditor, the interests are evidently to enforce his rights as a result of a judgment 
in an effi cient way ’ .). 
concern that legal justice, as understood by the society in both substantive 
and procedural terms, be done ’ . 18 Simply put, there is value in reaching an 
outcome that is just and legally correct — both substantively and procedur-
ally. N2 ’ s enforcement of an incorrect N1 judgment would be at odds with 
the value of correctness. For this reason, the judgment debtor may want the 
N2 court to subject the N1 judgment to some degree of procedural or sub-
stantive scrutiny before it is enforced, or it may wish to have the N2 court 
review the judgment in its entirety ( r é vision au fond ) to ensure a correct 
outcome. 
 Closely related to the value of correctness are  property rights . At least in 
the case of money judgments, the standard enforcement measure is execu-
tion, a process whereby the judgment debtor ’ s property is seized and sold to 
satisfy the judgment. If the judgment is not legally correct, then the taking of 
the judgment debtor ’ s property to satisfy the judgment would not be legally 
justifi ed, leading to a violation of the judgment debtor ’ s property rights. For 
this reason, the judgment debtor may want the N2 court to scrutinise the 
N1 judgment to serve not only the intrinsically important value of correct-
ness, but also the value of protecting the judgment debtor ’ s property rights. 
 Another rights value implicated by foreign judgment enforcement is 
 access to justice . Access to justice requires not only court access, but also a 
remedy when a person is legally entitled to one. 19 A plaintiff may be able to 
obtain court access in N1 to pursue a claim against a defendant. But if the 
N1 court issues a judgment in the plaintiff ’ s favour, the defendant refuses to 
satisfy the judgment and only has assets in N2, and N2 refuses to enforce 
the judgment, then the plaintiff may lack a remedy altogether and thus be 
denied meaningful access to justice. Moreover, in some cases a plaintiff — for 
either legal or practical reasons — may lack access to an N2 court where the 
prospective judgment debtor has assets. If N2 both fails to provide court 
access and refuses to enforce an N1 judgment, the result may be a transna-
tional access-to-justice gap. 20 When N2 enforces an N1 judgment, N2 helps 
complete the plaintiff ’ s access to justice rights by providing a legal remedy. 21 
 Governance values and rights values are not mutually exclusive. Pro-
tecting rights in particular cases can advance broader governance values, 
and governance values like effi ciency and certainty can benefi t individual 
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 22  See Von Mehren (n 15) 22 ( ‘ Embracing one [principle] to the complete exclusion of 
the other would be intolerable. Assigning an absolute value to correctness would create an 
 enormous social and economic burden, unduly reward the disputatious, and undermine the 
security of transactions and relations that is essential if economic and social life are to go 
 forward. On the other hand, giving full scope to the principle of repose would require that full 
and absolute fi nality be given to every determination made by an adjudicator of fi rst instance. 
But  … a system of justice that, in the name of repose, denied in every case a second chance 
would be perceived as fundamentally unjust.  … [A] tension persists between the two principles 
and no solution can ever be entirely stable nor demonstrably correct ’ .). 
 litigants. On the other hand, no approach to foreign judgment enforcement 
can simultaneously maximise all of these values. 22 Value trade-offs are 
therefore inevitable, and different approaches to foreign judgment enforce-
ment will entail different trade-offs. 
 II. A SPECTRUM OF APPROACHES TO FOREIGN 
JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT 
 In the absence of a global treaty on foreign judgment enforcement, there 
are diverse private international law approaches to foreign judgments. One 
way to arrange these approaches is along a spectrum indicating the extent to 
which they tend to favour enforcement, from a categorical always-enforce 
approach, to the usually-enforce approach that the US and the EU take to 
their respective internal judgments, to the sometimes-enforce approach that 
nations tend to take to external judgments, to a categorical never-enforce 
approach. These approaches strike different trade-offs among various gov-
ernance values and rights values. 
 A. Always Enforce 
 One approach to foreign judgments is  always enforce . This approach scores 
high on governance values. By enforcing the N1 judgment, N2 makes dupli-
cative litigation unnecessary, brings the parties ’ dispute to a close, and gives 
respect to N1 ’ s legal system, thus furthering the values of effi ciency, repose, 
certainty and comity. The always-enforce approach has mixed scores on 
rights values. On the one hand, it promotes access to justice by ensuring 
that a plaintiff can obtain a remedy based on a foreign judgment. On the 
other hand, it does so without regard to correctness and property rights, and 
therefore scores low on those values. 
 B. Usually Enforce: Full Faith and Credit and Internal US Judgments 
 A more nuanced approach is to  usually enforce foreign judgments. An 
example is the US full-faith-and-credit approach. The full-faith-and-
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 23  See 28 USC 1738 ( ‘ The  … judicial proceedings of any court of any  … State, Territory or 
Possession  … shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States 
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, 
Territory or Possession from which they are taken ’ .). 
 24  WM  Richman ,  WL  Reynolds and  CA  Whytock ,  Understanding Confl ict of Laws  4th edn 
( New Providence ,  LexisNexis ,  2013 )  388 . 
 25  ibid. 
 26  ibid, 393 – 94. 
 27  Baker v General Motors  522 US 222, 233 – 34 ( 1998 ) . See, eg, Restatement (Second) of 
Confl ict of Laws  § 103 ( ‘ A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be 
recognized or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the 
national policy of full faith and credit because it would involve an improper interference with 
important interests of the sister State ’ .);  Reading  & Bates v Baker Energy Resources  976 SW 
2d 702 ( Tex App  1998 ) ;  Blackwell v Haslam ,  2013  WL 3379364 (Tenn App 2013) . 
 28  Baker v General Motors (n 27) 233 – 34 (citations omitted). 
 29  WL  Reynolds and  WM  Richman ,  The Full Faith and Credit Clause ( Westport ,  Praeger , 
 2005 )  102 . 
credit clause — contained in Article IV, Section 1 of the US Constitution — 
provides that 
 [f]ull faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings of every other state. 
 A federal statute — 28 USC  § 1738 — implements the full-faith-and-credit 
clause by requiring that all courts in the United States, including both state 
and federal courts, give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of 
US states. 23 
 Full faith and credit is sometimes called an  ‘ iron law ’ because it can require 
one state (S2) to enforce another state ’ s (S1) judgment even if the judgment 
is based on a mistake of fact or law. 24 If the judgment debtor wishes to 
challenge the S1 judgment on the merits, it must do so in S1 ’ s courts — for 
example, by appealing to an S1 appellate court — but it cannot do so in S2. 25 
There are narrow exceptions to the general rule. Full faith and credit does 
not require S2 to enforce an S1 judgment if the S1 judgment was obtained 
by fraud or if the S1 court did not have jurisdiction. However, if the S1 court 
heard the issue of fraud or jurisdiction and decided against the judgment 
debtor, the S2 court must give full faith and credit to that decision. 26 
 The US Supreme Court has stated that there is no  ‘ roving public policy 
exception ’ to full faith and credit. 27 According to the Court,  ‘ [t]he full faith 
and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution 
by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independ-
ent, sovereign States into a nation  … [W]e are aware of [no] considerations 
of local policy or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the force 
and effect which the full faith and credit clause  … require[s] to be given to 
[a money] judgment outside the state of its rendition ’ . 28 But  ‘ the issue will 
not stay buried; like the mythical Phoenix, the notion that there is a  “ public 
policy ” exception to the Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit keeps trying to 
rise from the ashes ’ . 29 As one expert opines, however,  ‘ the Supreme Court 
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 30  SC  Symeonides ,  ‘ Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2013 :  Twenty-Seventh Annual 
Survey ’ ( 2014 )  62  American Journal of Comparative Law  223, 319 . 
 31  Reg No  1215/2012 of  12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012]  OJ L351/1 (hereinafter 
Brussels I Reg) . 
 32  See Brussels I Reg, Art 46 ( ‘ On the application of the person against whom enforcement 
is sought, the enforcement of a judgment shall be refused where one of the grounds referred to 
in Article 45 is found to exist ’ .). 
has not endorsed [a public policy exception] and its precedents seem to 
negate it ’ . 30 
 The US full-faith-and-credit approach is not far from the always-enforce 
ideal type, and thus scores high on governance values, as well as on the rights 
value of access to justice (albeit not as high as the always-enforce approach). 
By allowing for the possibility of non-enforcement in S2 on the ground of 
fraud or lack of S1 jurisdiction, the US full-faith-and-credit approach falls 
short of maximising the governance values of effi ciency, repose and cer-
tainty. Because full faith and credit applies to the S1 court ’ s decisions on 
its own jurisdiction and on claims of fraud, however, the value of comity 
nevertheless should ordinarily be protected. To a slightly greater extent than 
the always-enforce approach, the US full-faith-and-credit approach fur-
thers the rights values of correctness and property rights by providing some 
 protection against enforcement when the S1 judgment was a result of fraud 
or the S1 court lacked jurisdiction. Any trade-off against access to justice 
due to the fraud exception would seem to be an equitable one in cases where 
it is the judgment creditor who committed the fraud. 
 C. Usually Enforce: The Brussels I Regulation and Internal EU Judgments 
 The private international law rules governing the enforcement of a judg-
ment of a court of one EU member (M1) in another EU member (M2) are 
contained in the recently recast Brussels I Regulation. 31 These rules lie far-
ther from the always-enforce end of the spectrum than the rules of US full 
faith and credit, but, as explained below, they are getting closer. Under the 
Brussels I Regulation, there is a general rule requiring enforcement of an M1 
judgment in M2, unless one of the grounds for refusing enforcement listed 
in Article 45(1) is found to exist: 32 
 On the application of any interested party, the recognition of a judgment shall be 
refused: 
 (a)  if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy ( ordre public ) in 
the Member State addressed; 
 (b)  where the judgment was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was 
not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an 
equivalent document in suffi cient time and in such a way as to enable him to 
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 33  These provisions are intended to protect parties assumed to be relatively weak. See 
 M  Bogdan ,  Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law  2nd edn ( Groningen , 
 Europa Law Publishing ,  2012 )  53 (noting that the equivalent special jurisdictional provisions 
in the Brussels I Reg are intended  ‘ to protect the weaker party (the person claiming insurance 
benefi ts, the consumer, the employee) against being sued in other Member States than his own, 
while at the same time giving the same weaker party the option to sue in his own country even 
when the defendant is domiciled in another Member State ’ ). 
 34  For example,  ‘ in proceedings which have as their object rights  in rem in immovable prop-
erty  … the courts of the Member State in which the property is situated ’ has exclusive jurisdic-
tion. Brussels I Reg, Art 24(1). 
 35  See  P  Hay ,  ‘ The Development of the Public Policy Barrier to Judgment Recognition 
Within the European Community ’ ( 2007 )  6  The European Legal Forum  289, 290 (noting that 
the Brussels I Reg ’ s recognition command is in this respect  stronger than US full faith and credit 
 ‘ because it is combined with jurisdictional bases that must be observed by rendering courts ’ ). 
 36  See  P  Stone ,  EU Private International Law  2nd edn ( Cheltenham ,  Edward Elgar Publish-
ing ,  2010 )  239 (noting that the ECJ has  ‘ consistently emphasised ’ that the public policy excep-
tion  ‘ should operate only in exceptional cases ’ ). 
arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings 
to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so; 
 (c)  if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given between the same par-
ties in the Member State addressed; 
 (d)  if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another 
Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and 
between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfi ls the con-
ditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed; or 
 (e)  if the judgment confl icts with: (i) [the special jurisdictional provisions of] 
 Sections 3, 4 or 5 of Chapter II where the policyholder, the insured, a benefi ciary 
of the insurance contract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee was 
the defendant; 33 or (ii) [the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of] Section 6 of 
Chapter II. 34 
 Overall, the Brussels I Regulation — like the US full-faith-and-credit 
approach — scores high on the governance values of effi ciency, repose, cer-
tainty and comity. In one respect, the Brussels I Regulation may score even 
higher on these values because lack of personal jurisdiction is not a ground 
for refusing enforcement (except pursuant to Article 45(1)(e), where the 
judgment confl icts with the Brussels I Regulation ’ s special jurisdictional pro-
visions designed to protect weak parties — but even then, Article 45(2) pro-
vides that M2 shall be bound by the fi ndings of fact on which M1 based its 
jurisdiction). 35 However, this difference should not be overstated because, 
as noted above, under the US law of full faith and credit, S2 must give full 
faith and credit to an S1 court ’ s jurisdictional rulings. The most salient dif-
ference in terms of governance values is the Brussels I Regulation ’ s public 
policy exception, which entails a trade-off against the values of effi ciency, 
repose, certainty and comity. However, because the public policy ground is 
very narrow, this difference, too, should not be overstated. 36 
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 37  Perhaps the EU emphasis on these governance values at the expense of the rights value of 
correctness was most clearly expressed in the ECJ ’ s judgment in  Turner , a jurisdiction case, in 
which it ruled that a court of one EU member (in this case the United Kingdom) is prohibited 
from issuing an antisuit injunction barring a party from pursuing proceedings in the same case 
in a court of another EU member (in this case Spain)  ‘ even where that party is acting in bad 
faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings ’ :  Case 159/02  Turner [ 2004 ]  ECR 
I-3565 , para 31. One US commentator argues that the ECJ ’ s approach in  Turner  ‘ elevates a 
quest for effi ciency over a quest for equity ’ .  R  Brand ,  ‘ Hague Academy of International Law ’ 
( 2011 )  358  Recueil des Cours  9, 177 . See also  Case C-116/02  Gasser [ 2003 ]  ECR I-14693 , 
para 54 (requiring Austria to dismiss a case under the fi rst-court-seized rule where suit was 
fi rst fi led in Italy, despite the parties ’ exclusive choice-of-court agreement selecting an Austrian 
court). Art 31 of the recast Brussels I Reg changes the rule announced in  Gasser by prioritising 
courts with exclusive jurisdiction under a choice-of-court agreement. 
 38  CMV  Clarkson and  J  Hill ,  The Confl ict of Laws  4th edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2011 )  197 . For an analysis of EU Member Court decisions on the applicability of the 
Brussels I Reg ’ s public policy exception in cases where fraud is alleged, see  Burkhard  Hess , 
 Thomas  Pfeiffer and  Peter  Schlosser ,  Report on the Application of Reg Brussels I in the Mem-
ber States ( Sep 2007, Study JLS/C4/2005/03 ), available at  ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/
study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf . 
 39  XE  Kramer ,  ‘ Cross-border Enforcement in the EU :  Mutual Trust versus Fair Trial ? 
Towards Principles of European Civil Procedure ’ ( 2011 )  2  International Journal of Procedural 
Law  202, 219 ( ‘ A safety net for the violation of fair trial principles is provided [by the  Brussels I 
Reg] at the enforcement level through the ground of refusal relating to public policy ’ .). 
 Similar to US full faith and credit, the same features that make the Brussels I 
Regulation score high on governance values make it score lower on the 
rights values of correctness and property rights, and relatively high on access 
to justice. 37 The absence of a fraud ground and a general jurisdictional 
ground for refusal of enforcement might suggest an even lower score on 
correctness and property rights (and a higher score on access to justice) than 
US full faith and credit. The public policy exception, however, may allow 
non-enforcement in a limited number of exceptional instances of fraud, par-
ticularly if the fraud is found to have precluded a fair trial, 38 and in addi-
tion to the limited special jurisdictional grounds for refusal noted above, 
there are protections for the right to adequate notice in Article 45(1)(b) 
applicable to default judgments. More broadly, the public policy exception 
can be understood as providing a  ‘ safety net ’ that furthers the values of 
correctness and property rights by allowing M2 to refuse enforcement of 
an M1 judgment where M1 failed to provide procedural rights — including 
those fair trial rights assured by Article 6(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights 39 — which would go beyond the grounds for refusal 
expressly available under the US law of full faith and credit. These doctrinal 
nuances defy measurement. Comparative empirical analysis of actual court 
decisions in US full-faith-and-credit and EU Brussels I Regulation enforce-
ment cases would ultimately be necessary to evaluate which approach scores 
higher on various governance values and rights values. 
 There is, however, a trend in the EU ’ s internal approach to foreign judg-
ments in a direction that refl ects a further emphasis on the governance val-
ues of effi ciency, repose, certainty and comity and the rights value of access 
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 40  See  European Commission,  ‘ Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a regula-
tion of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) ’ SEC(2010) 1547 fi nal, 
15 (hereinafter Impact Assessment) (noting abolition of  exequatur in Reg  805/2004 of 2 1 April 
2004 establishing a European enforcement order for uncontested claims [2004]  OJ L143/15 , 
Reg 1896/2006 of 12 December 2006 creating a  European Order for Payment Procedure 
[ 2006 ]  OJ L399/1 , Reg 861/2007 of 11 July 2007 creating a  European Small Claims Proce-
dure [ 2007 ]  OJ L199/1 , and Reg 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance 
obligations [2009] OJ L7/1). 
 41  Stone (n 36) 265. 
 42  A  Dickinson ,  ‘ Surveying the Proposed Brussels I bis Reg — Solid Foundations but Renova-
tion Needed ’ ( 2010 )  12  Yearbook of Private International Law  247, 267 . 
 43  T  Schilling ,  ‘ The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights ’ ( January 2012 )  4 , available at  works.bepress.com/theodor_schilling/9 . 
 44  See  B  Hess ,  Note on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters (Recast) ( Brussels ,  European Parliament ,  2011 ) , available at  www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/453201/IPOL-JURI_NT(2011)453201_EN.pdf . 
 45  P  Hay ,  ‘ Notes on the European Union ’ s Brussels-I  “ Recast ” Regulation :  An American 
Perspective, European Legal Forum ’ ( 2013 )  The European Legal Forum  1, 6 . 
 46  SP  Baumgartner ,  ‘ Changes in the European Union ’ s Regime of Recognizing and Enforcing 
Foreign Judgments and Transnational Litigation in the United States ’ ( 2012 )  18  Southwestern 
Journal of International Law  567 . 
to justice: EU law has made it progressively easier to enforce EU Member 
judgments in other EU Members. Most notably, one of the highlights of 
the recast Brussels I Regulation is the elimination of  exequatur — that is, a 
declaration of enforceability by M2 — as a prerequisite for enforcement of 
an M1 judgment in M2. In certain specialised areas of EU law,  exequatur 
had already been abolished. 40 But implementing this change for judgments 
in civil and commercial matters more generally is an important step toward 
facilitating the enforcement of foreign judgments within the EU — albeit 
arguably at the expense of the values of correctness and property rights. 
As Peter Stone argues,  ‘ [t]he effect of the change — will usually be to reduce 
from an already low level the protection which a defendant can obtain from 
the courts of his own country ’ . 41 Similarly, Andrew Dickinson argues that 
 exequatur provides signifi cant protection against fraudulent enforcement 
 proceedings. 42 Moreover, according to a recent study, the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights  ‘ clearly recognizes the value of 
exequatur or similar proceedings for the protection of human rights of the 
judgment debtor ’ . 43 But others note that exequatur rarely resulted in non-
enforcement anyway, and argue that in any event the ability of a judgment 
debtor to apply for refusal of enforcement and appeal a decision to deny 
that application renders the elimination of exequatur inconsequential from 
a rights perspective. 44 For example, Peter Hay argues that  ‘ abolition of the 
exequatur streamlines the recognition process, but  … does not change it 
much substantively ’ . 45 Similarly, Samuel Baumgartner argues that  ‘ the aboli-
tion of the declaration of enforceability sounds like a bolder move than it 
really is ’ . 46 
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 48  ibid, preamble 6. 
 49  Above n 47, recital 26. 
 50  Lookofsky and Hertz (n 14) 137 – 40. 
 51  R  Brand ,  ‘ Hague Academy of International Law ’ ( 2011 )  358  Recueil des Cours  9, 103 . 
 But whether or not this move signifi cantly undermines the rights values 
of correctness and property rights, it indicates a stronger EU emphasis than 
before on the governance values of effi ciency, repose, certainty and comity. 
In fact, these governance values are expressed in the Brussels I  Regulation 
itself. As its preamble notes, it is essential to eliminate  ‘ [c]ertain differences 
between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments 
[that] hamper the sound operation of the internal market ’ and to put in 
place rules  ‘ to ensure rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of 
 judgments ’ , 47 in furtherance of  ‘ the objective of free circulation of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters ’ . 48 Regarding  exequatur specifi -
cally, the preamble explains that  ‘ the aim of making cross-border litigation 
less time-consuming and costly justifi es the abolition of the declaration of 
enforceability prior to enforcement in the Member State addressed ’ . 49 
 D. Sometimes Enforce: The US Approach to External Judgments 
 US full-faith-and-credit applies only to judgments from within the US and 
the Brussels I Regulation applies only to judgments from within the EU. In 
that sense, they both deal with  ‘ internal ’ judgments. Private international 
law regarding  ‘ external ’ judgments is generally farther from the always-
enforce end of the spectrum than private international law regarding inter-
nal judgments. Some nations only enforce an external N1 foreign judgment 
if a treaty with N1 requires them to do so, and some only enforce based on 
reciprocity — that is, if N1 would enforce an N2 judgment under the same 
circumstances. 50 In other nations, including the United States, private inter-
national law takes a more nuanced  sometimes enforce approach to external 
foreign judgments by combining a general rule in favour of enforcement 
with a list of grounds for refusal. 51 
 In the US, state law (not federal law) generally provides the rules govern-
ing the enforcement of external foreign judgments. For many years, the most 
common approach among US states was legislation based on the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which was approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uniform 
Law Commission) in 1962 (1962 Act). The 1962 Act has three mandatory 
and six discretionary grounds for refusal: 
 (a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if 
(1)  the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of 
due process of law; 
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 52  See ss 3 and 4 of  Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 ( 1962 ). 
See  ss 481 and 482 of the  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
attempts to restate the common law of foreign judgment enforcement, and it is for the most 
part consistent with the  1962 Act. 
 53  See s 4(c) of 2005 Act. Moreover, in 2005, the American Law Institute adopted a pro-
posed federal statute on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments that included a 
mandatory version of the 2005 Act ’ s judicial integrity exception. See American Law Institute, 
 ‘ Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute ’ 
s 5(a)(ii) (2006) (barring recognition or enforcement if  ‘ the judgment was rendered in circum-
stances that raise substantial and justifi able doubt about the integrity of the rendering court 
with respect to the judgment in question ’ ) (hereinafter ALI Proposed Statute). 
(2)  the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or 
(3)  the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
 (b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if 
(1)  the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive 
notice of the proceedings in suffi cient time to enable him to defend; 
(2)  the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
(3)  the  … [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to 
the public policy of this state; 
(4)  the judgment confl icts with another fi nal and conclusive judgment; 
(5)  the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement 
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be set-
tled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or 
(6)  in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign 
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action. 52 
 By including a wide range of grounds for refusing enforcement, the 1962 
Act scores lower on the governance values of effi ciency, repose, certainty 
and comity and on the rights value of access to justice than either the US 
full-faith-and-credit or the EU Brussels I Regulation approaches to internal 
judgments. In terms of the values of correctness and property, the 1962 Act 
scores relatively high by requiring or allowing an N2 court in the US to 
refuse enforcement when it fi nds one of the enumerated procedural defects 
or fraud. 
 In 2005, however, the Uniform Law Commission adopted a new uniform 
act to replace the 1962 Act: the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judg-
ments Recognition Act of 2005 (2005 Act). The 2005 Act adds two discre-
tionary grounds for refusal not contained in the 1962 Act, providing that a 
court need not recognise a foreign-country judgment if: 
 (7)  the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt 
about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment; or 
 (8)  the specifi c proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not 
compatible with the requirements of due process of law. 53 
 This change invites US judges to more closely scrutinise the specifi c for-
eign proceedings leading to a judgment. Traditionally, the failure of due 
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 54  See s 4 of 1962 Act (providing systemic but not case-specifi c due process exception). 
However, based on a review of US court decisions, one scholar has concluded that even when 
courts apply the systemic due process standard, they in fact tend to consider case-specifi c fac-
tors. See  PB  Stephan ,  ‘ Unjust Legal Systems and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments ’ in 
 PB  Stephan (ed),  Foreign Court Judgments and the United States Legal System ( Leiden ,  Brill , 
 2014 ) . 
 55  The US Virgin Islands and 15 states have legislation based on the 1962 Act: Alaska, 
 Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New 
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia. However, two of these states —
 Massachusetts and Virginia — have introduced pending legislation based on the 2005 Act. See 
 www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign%20Money%20Judgments
%20Recognition%20Act (last visited 4 March 2014). The District of Columbia and 18 states 
have adopted legislation based on the 2005 Act: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington. In addition, legislation based on the 2005 
Act has been introduced in Massachusetts, Mississippi and Virginia. See  www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition
%20Act (last visited 4 March 2014). 
 56  See s 5, comment c, of ALI Proposed Statute. 
 57  Society of Lloyd ’ s v Ashenden ,  233 F 3d 473, 477 ( 7th Cir  2000 ) . 
 58  CA  Whytock ,  ‘ Some Cautionary Notes on the  “ Chevronization ” of Transnational Liti-
gation ’ ( 2013 )  1  Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation  467, 479 ; Whytock and Robertson 
(n 19). 
process in a particular case has not been suffi cient to refuse enforcement. 54 
Nevertheless, a growing number of US States are enacting legislation based 
on the 2005 Act, and today there are already more 2005 Act States than 
1962 Act States. 55 Thus, the 2005 Act and its new case-specifi c grounds for 
refusal are rapidly becoming the norm in US law. 
 The shift toward new case-specifi c grounds for non-enforcement is a shift 
towards a greater emphasis on the rights values of correctness and prop-
erty. On the other hand, this trend cuts against the governance values of 
effi ciency, repose, certainty and comity. Commentators in the US are not 
unaware of these costs. For example, the American Law Institute rejected 
a case-specifi c due process exception in its proposed federal statute on 
foreign judgments, explaining that  ‘ [s]uch a detailed inquiry into the for-
eign judgment is inconsistent with the pro-enforcement philosophy of [the 
1962] Act ’ . 56 Similarly, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
expressed the concern that a case-specifi c approach would be  ‘ inconsist-
ent with providing a streamlined, expeditious method for collecting money 
judgments rendered by courts in other jurisdictions ’ and  ‘ would in effect 
[allow] a further appeal on the merits  … thus converting every successful 
multinational suit for damages into two suits  … ’ . 57 Concerns from an access 
to justice perspective have also been raised. 58 But these concerns ultimately 
have not carried the day, as suggested by the increasingly widespread adop-
tion of the 2005 Act by US States. 
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 E. Never Enforce 
 Finally, as a point of comparison, it is helpful to consider a categorical  never 
enforce approach. By preventing enforcement of an N1 judgment in N2, this 
approach scores low on the governance values of effi ciency, repose, certainty 
and comity. It has mixed scores on rights values, however. It is agnostic as to 
the value of correctness in the sense that it refuses enforcement without any 
inquiry into the judgment ’ s actual substantive or procedural correctness. It 
scores high on the value of property rights because it categorically protects 
the judgment debtor ’ s N2 property from being used to satisfy the N1 judg-
ment (albeit in an unprincipled way that is not linked to correctness). And 
it scores low on the value of access to justice by preventing a successful 
plaintiff from obtaining a remedy in N2 based on the N1 judgment, even in 
situations where the judgment debtor ’ s only assets are in N2. 
 III. BROADER IMPLICATIONS: DESIGN, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
 The analysis presented above has implications for the design of private inter-
national law rules on foreign judgment enforcement. It also raises questions 
about the factors that infl uence how these rules evolve and about the impact 
of various approaches to foreign judgment enforcement on the market for 
dispute resolution services. 
 A. Fundamental Design Principles 
 As demonstrated above, different approaches to foreign judgment enforce-
ment refl ect different trade-offs between different enforcement values. These 
trade-offs are inevitable because governance values and rights values cannot 
be simultaneously maximised. For example, as this chapter ’ s analysis shows, 
scores on the values of effi ciency, repose, certainty, comity and access to 
justice tend to be inversely correlated with scores on the values of correct-
ness and property rights. This means that in any effort to design or reform 
private international law rules, a single-minded focus on a particular sub-
set of these values is likely to result in rules that have unintended negative 
consequences for other values. This suggests two fundamental principles of 
design for rules governing foreign judgments: 
 —  First, the implications of the rules for all governance and rights values 
should be thoroughly analysed before settling on a given approach. 
 —  Second, the inevitable trade-offs among these values should be made 
explicitly and transparently by lawmakers. 
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 59  European Commission,  ‘ Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast) ’ COM ( 2010 ) 748 fi nal, (hereinafter Brussels I Recast Proposal). 
The proposal did add, however, a limited right for a judgment debtor to  ‘ apply for a refusal of 
recognition or enforcement of a judgment where such recognition or enforcement would not 
be permitted by the fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial ’ (Art 46) and 
it preserved the public policy ground for certain specifi ed defamation and collective redress 
claims (Art 37). See Kramer (n 21) 365 (noting that the proposed removal of the public policy 
exception was  ‘ extensively debated ’ and arguing that  ‘ [t]he protection of public policy is to be 
regarded as a matter of the rule of law and has always been regarded as a necessary safety valve 
in private international law ’ ). 
 B. Explaining the Evolution of Foreign Judgment Enforcement 
 Stepping back from design principles, what factors might explain — as a 
matter of positive theory — how the law of foreign judgments evolves from 
the never-enforce end of the spectrum toward the always-enforce end of the 
spectrum (or vice versa) ? 
 —  First, the evolution of private international law rules governing for-
eign judgments is likely to be strongly infl uenced by cross-national 
patterns of procedural and substantive legal convergence. Specifi cally, 
other things being equal, as cross-national procedural and substan-
tive convergence increases, procedural and substantive grounds for 
refusal are likely to decrease. This is because procedural grounds for 
non-enforcement are less necessary if the nations involved have simi-
lar procedural rules, and substantive grounds for non-enforcement —
 such as public policy — are less important if those nations have similar 
 substantive law and policy. 
 It would seem that there is more procedural and substantive convergence 
among US States than among EU members, and more convergence in each 
of these cases than among nations globally. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the US internal full-faith-and-credit approach is closest to the always-
enforce approach, with the EU ’ s internal Brussels I Regulation approach 
slightly farther away from it, and the US approach to external foreign judg-
ments still farther away. This may also help explain the rejection of the 
European Commission ’ s proposal to eliminate the public policy exception 
in the recast Brussels I Regulation. 59 
 —  Second, the evolution of private international law rules governing 
 foreign judgments is likely to be strongly infl uenced by levels of mutual 
trust among nations. Specifi cally, other things being equal, as mutual 
trust increases, grounds for refusal are likely to decrease. 
 In the EU, the concept of mutual trust has played an animating role in pri-
vate international law since at least the early 1990s. In  Sonntag v  Waidmann , 
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 60  Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in  Case C-172/91  Sonntag v Waidmann [ 1993 ] 
 ECR I-1963 , paras 71 – 72. 
 61  Recital 26 of Brussels I Recast.  X  Kramer ,  ‘ Procedure Matters :  Construction and Decon-
structivism in European Civil Procedure ’ ( 2012 )  33  Erasmus Law Lectures  18 ( ‘ Based on this 
pillar [mutual trust], the European Commission wishes to abolish the permission of courts for 
the enforcement of judgments rendered in another EU Member State. The idea is that if there is 
full mutual trust, this permission (called  exequatur ) is no longer required ’ ). 
 62  K  Patchel ,  Study Report on Possible Amendment of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act, 25 June 2003, 26 , available at  www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
foreign%20country%20money%20judgments%20recognition/ufmjra_apr04_studyrpt.pdf . 
 63  Discussion Draft of 2005 Act, October 2004, 7. The American Law Institute ’ s commen-
tary on the corruption ground for non-enforcement in its proposed federal statute on for-
eign judgments also expresses distrust, noting  ‘ concerns about corruption in the judiciaries of 
certain countries ’ . The drafters acknowledge that  ‘ [t]he defense of possible corruption in the 
rendering court is one that has not traditionally been an explicit ground for nonrecognition or 
nonenforcement by courts in the United States ’ . But they explain that  ‘ concerns about corrup-
tion in the judiciaries of certain countries and the effect of corruption in the particular case led 
to inclusion of this additional defense ’ . 
a 1993 case before the European Court of Justice, Advocate General Dar-
mon stated in his opinion that 
 [t]he principle of the recognition of judgments is based on the Member States ’ 
mutual trust in their respective legal systems and judicial institutions. This trust 
allows the Member States to waive their internal rules on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. 60 
 The recast Brussels I Regulation explicitly links the abolition of exequatur 
to mutual trust: 
 Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Union justifi es the principle 
that judgments given in a Member State should be recognised in all Member States 
without the need for any special procedure.  … As a result, a judgment given by the 
courts of a Member State should be treated as if it had been given in the Member 
State addressed. 61 
 Conversely, where there is less mutual trust, more grounds for refusal are 
likely. In the US, both of the new case-specifi c exceptions added by the 
2005 Act were justifi ed in terms of a lack of  ‘ mutual trust ’ even though the 
exact words are not used. As the Study Report for the 2005 Act pointed 
out regarding its new case-specifi c due process exception,  ‘ [t]here is less 
expectation that foreign courts will follow procedures comporting with 
U.S. notions of due process and jurisdiction or that they will apply substan-
tively tolerable laws, and there may be suspicions of unfairness or fraud ’ . 62 
The Reporter ’ s Notes to a draft of the 2005 Act also noted support for the 
2005 Act ’ s case-specifi c judicial integrity exception based on the  perception 
that  ‘ bribery and other forms of judicial misconduct can be a real issue 
with regard to certain foreign country judgments ’ . 63 The federal statute 
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[ 2005 ]  ECR I-1383 , para 144. 
on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments proposed by the 
 American Law Institute in 2005 justifi ed its mandatory judicial integrity 
exception in similar terms: 
 The defense of possible corruption in the rendering court is one that has not tradi-
tionally been an explicit ground for nonrecognition or nonenforcement by courts 
in the United States. However, concerns about corruption in the judiciaries of 
certain countries and the effect of corruption in the particular case led to inclusion 
of this additional defense. 64 
 It is noteworthy that the European Commission has also used lack of mutual 
trust as a reason for not extending the Brussels I regime to non-EU mem-
bers, raising concerns that  ‘ companies might not always get a fair trial and 
an adequate protection of their rights before the courts of a third State ’ and 
that  ‘ [s]uch problems can notably arise in countries where the judiciary can-
not be considered to be independent or is riven by corruption ’ . 65 Similarly, 
in his opinion in  Owusu v NB Jackson , Advocate General L é ger explained 
that the EU established the simplifi ed Brussels Convention mechanism for 
recognition and enforcement 
 in a specifi c context characterised by mutual trust between the Member States of 
the Community regarding their legal systems and their judicial institutions. How-
ever, the same situation does not necessarily prevail in relations between Member 
States and non-Contracting States. That is why this mechanism of the Convention 
applies only to judgments given by courts of a Member State in the context of 
their recognition and enforcement in another Member State. 66 
 These two conjectures imply that further substantive and procedural con-
vergence between EU members on the one hand and US states on the other 
hand, accompanied by measures to build an area of transatlantic mutual 
trust in the administration of justice, could improve prospects for the rati-
fi cation and implementation of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements and, perhaps eventually, on a more generally applicable frame-
work for the transatlantic enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 C.  Enforcement of Judgments and the Market for Dispute 
Resolution Services 
 Yet another consideration is the effect of different approaches to foreign 
 judgment enforcement on the market for dispute resolution in civil and 
commercial matters. This market has two dimensions: an international 
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dimension, which involves competition among nations, and a public –
 private dimension, which involves competition between national courts 
and  arbitration. The law of foreign judgments affects both dimensions of 
competition. 
 —  First, other things being equal, rules favouring enforcement of judg-
ments among a group of nations is likely to increase competition among 
the courts of those nations. 
 Absent such rules, a plaintiff will have a strong incentive to sue in the 
courts of a nation (N1) where the defendant has assets, even if the courts 
of another nation (N2) are more effi cient or otherwise more appropriate. 
This is because if the plaintiff sues in N2 and obtains a favourable judg-
ment there, it may not be possible to enforce that judgment in N1. In con-
trast, with rules favouring the enforcement of N2 judgments in N1 (and vice 
versa), the plaintiff ’ s choice of court will not depend so heavily on concerns 
about enforcement, and competition between N1 and N2 courts will instead 
be based primarily on their other respective advantages and disadvantages 
as providers of dispute resolution services. 
 Of course other considerations (especially jurisdictional rules) can also 
affect this competition. But holding those considerations constant, the 
implication is that competition among national courts would be greater 
among US states and among EU members where rules favour enforcement 
of internal judgments than between courts in the US and courts in the EU. 
A party may prefer an EU member ’ s courts, but sue in the US because that 
is where the defendant ’ s assets lie (or vice versa). This distorts the interna-
tional dimension of competition for dispute resolution services in the trans-
atlantic area. A further implication is that an EU – US judgment enforcement 
agreement or a multinational agreement with enforcement provisions (such 
as the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements) could enhance 
the international dimension of competitiveness of the market for dispute 
resolution services in the transatlantic area. 
 —  Second, other things being equal, rules favouring enforcement of 
judgments among a group of nations is likely to increase competition 
between the courts of those nations and arbitration. 
 Private international law rules governing the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments has an important impact on this public – private dimension of the 
market for dispute resolution services. One of the major advantages of arbi-
tration as a method of transnational dispute resolution is that most nations 
tend to enforce foreign arbitral awards, subject to narrow and exclusive 
grounds for refusal, in accordance with the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) 
and similar regional arrangements. This gives parties an incentive to select 
arbitration even if they otherwise have strong reasons to prefer litigation in 
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 67  Brand (n 37) 149 – 51. 
a national court (such as a desire for an appellate review process). The lack 
of an analogous treaty regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments dis-
torts this dimension of the market for dispute resolution services. 
 If, for example, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
enters into effect for a signifi cant number of nations, enforcement issues 
will no longer tip the scale in favour of arbitration to the extent they do 
now. 67 And even now, where litigation in an EU member ’ s courts is at least 
as attractive to a claimant as arbitration, the Brussels I Regulation ’ s rules on 
enforcement should signifi cantly level the playing fi eld when the respondent 
has assets in at least one EU member ’ s territory, and the same would seem 
to be the case internally to the US full-faith-and-credit regime. 
 None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that unbridled competition 
for dispute resolution services is necessarily desirable. The point is simply 
that when designing an approach to foreign judgment enforcement, private 
international law-makers should be attentive to the implications of their 
rules for both the international and public – private dimensions of the mar-
ket for dispute resolution services. Further interdisciplinary study of the 
implications of different approaches to foreign judgment enforcement for 
governance values and rights values, and of the causes and consequences of 
variation across different approaches, promises to provide important foun-
dations for understanding and reforming private international law in the 
transatlantic area and beyond. 
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